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BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS: COMMITTEE ON BANKING
REGULATIONS AND SUPERVISORY PRACTICES' CONSULTATIVE PAPER ON
PROPOSALS FOR INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL
MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS*
[December 1987]
+Cite as 27 I.L.M. 524 (1988)+
Introductory Note
Cynthia C. Lichtenstein
In 1986, I.L.M. published a prior paper prepared by the Bank
for International Settlements' Committee on Banking Regulations and
Supervisory Practices (often called the "Cooke Committee" after its
Chairman, Peter Cooke of the Bank of England, or, sometimes, the
Basle Supervisors' Committee) on Management of Banks' Off-Balance-
Sheet Exposures [25 I.L.M. 978 (1986)]. As the Introductory Note
to that paper explained, that paper represented a waystone in the
search by the banking supervisors of the major industrialized
countries for a means to coordinate prudential supervision over
banking organizations in their international activities. The Basle
Supervisors' Committee had studied the nature of the risks involved
in the new practices in international banking that had evolved
since 1985 and the paper was issued, according to the Committee,
"to encourage" a coordinated response to the new developments.
"Encouragement" to harmonized action, however, was all that was
intended; as the Committe noted, the paper was not "intended to be
prescriptive." Exactly how national authorities might go about
gaining coordinated prudential control over the multinational banks
subject to their jurisdiction was not spelled out. Essentially,
the 1986 paper was only a sign post that national authorities could
choose to follow, if so motivated.
The difficulty, of course, with leaving the actual prudential
standard setting strictly up to individual national authorities is
that, as has been well pointed out by Richard Dale in his recent
book, 1/ national authorities have conflicting interests. The
industr'ialized nations have a common interest in ensuring the
soundness of the entities, the multinational banks, that provide
the international payments system. At the same time, each nation
has an interest in furthering the profitability of its multi-
national banks as against those banks' competitors, the banks of
the other nations, an interest that can lead, in Dale's term, to
"an inbuilt tendency towards competitive deregulation." 2/
*[Reproduced from the text provided to International Legal
Materials by the Bank for International Settlements. The Intro-
ductory Note to the Basle Committee Paper on Proposals For
International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital
Standards was prepared for International Legal Materials by Cynthia
C. Lichtenstein, Professor, Boston College Law School and Consul-
tant, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy. Once again thanks are due
to Andrew Spindler of the New York Reserve Bank for his most
helpful cooperation in making shorter BIS documents easily avail-
able to scholars in the United States].
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United States regulatory authorities had issued proposed
regulations imposing supplemental capital requirements that were
calibrated to risk and included requirements for off-balance-sheet
exposures along with lines suggested by the Basle Supervisors'
Committee's 1986 paper. 3/ The comments from the affected banks on
the proposed regulations, of course, pointed out the extent to
which United States banking organizations would be hampered in
competition with foreign banks, were foreign banks to be free from
such capital requirements.
The response of the United States regulators to this plaint was
the announcement in January, 1987 of a risk-adjusted capital
proposal that had been worked out jointly by the Federal Reserve,
the United States central bank, and the Bank of England, the United
Kingdom's central bank. The proposal, as released for public
comment in a news release dated January 8, 1987 4/ was entitled
"Agreed Proposal of the United States Federal Banking Supervisory
Authorities and the Bank of England on Primary Capital and Capital
Adequacy Assessment." 5/ The title itself is significant. The two
central banks, in the main, had made common accord as to the
capital base that would be required of banks subject to each
country's jurisdiction including the required capital to support
off-balance-sheet business and merchant banking activities.
Equally important, however, was the hope of the U.K. and the U.S.
supervisory authorities that their agreement would "provide a
reasonable basis for working with other countries to achieve a more
consistent international framework for assessing capital adequacy."
6/
In short, the U.S. and the U.K. regulators accepted the
difficulties of actual implementation of the new standards unless
the supervisory authorities of Japan and the rest of Western
Europe, the home bases of the chief market competition for U.K. and
U.S. multinational banks, could be persuaded to go along. While
the U.S. banking authorities promulgated proposed regulations to
implement the U.S./U.K. proposal, 7/ most likely to permit the
industry to comment and to acclimate-the banks affected to the new
notion that the regulatory ideology of central banks of other
nations might have an impact on United States banking regulation,
the agencies deferred final action on the U.S/U.K. Agreed Proposal
until more countries joined the party. 8/
Throughout the period of issuance of the U.S./U.K. Agreed
Proposal, the Cooke Committee had continued to meet in Basle, and
presumably, continued to try to hammer out the technical details of
a proposal which would result in reduction, at least in so far as
capital requirements for international banking are concerned, of
competitive inequality arising from differences in supervisory
requirements among nations. The following document (significantly,
referred to as the "Basle Agreement" in the Federal Reserve Board
staff memorandum forwarding to the Federal Reserve Board the
proposed interagency Federal Register Notice putting out the U.S.
capital adequacy regulations proposed to implement the inter-
nationally agreed to standards 9/) represents a quite extraordinary
achievement of those experts on the Cooke Committee and their
principals, the central banks of twelve nations, that have agreed,
in the interest of the stability and soundness of the international
financial system, to burden equally with a common standard of
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capital adequacy the banks under their jurisdiction. In less than
two years, the central banks of twelve industrialized nations have
moved from a stance of encouraging coordination in capital
requirements "in the light of the legal and other institutional
circumstances" 10/ of each sovereign to an agreed upon, highly
articulated, wit precisely delineated minority views, framework
for common standards. This "Basle Agreement" provides national
supervisory authorities with some discretion in implementation, but
the basic harmonization is one that leaves no room for competitive
laxity in capital requirements.
There follows after the BIS' Consultative Paper the Bank of
England's Explanatory Paper for U.K. banks of how it intends to
implement the framework, and exercise the limited discretion
authorized it by the Agreement.
1/ Dale, Richard, The Regulation of International Banking, (1986),
page 171.
2/ Ibid., page 172.
3/ See footnote 9 to the Introductory Note to the 1986 paper, 25
I.L.M. 981 (1986) for the citations in the Federal Register of the
proposals.
4/ Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Deposit Insurance Corpor-
ation, and Federal Reserve Board Joint News Release, January 8,
1987, reprinted in Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) Paragraph 86,776
(January 16, 1987).
5/ This proposal was published for comment by the Federal Reserve
Board on February 19, 1987 at 52 Fed. Reg. 5135 through 5139. The
proposed revised capital adequacy regulation that the Federal
Reserve issued to implement the Agreed Proposal is published at 52
Fed. Reg. 5119 et seq. (1987); the Comptroller of the Currency's
proposed "guidel 5ies at 52 Fed. Reg. 23045 et seq. (1987); and
FDIC's at 52 Fed. Reg. 11476 et seq. (1987). For a student note
discussing the Agreed Proposal and its provisions, particularly the
ways in which the United States and the United Kingdom agreed to
disagree and not harmonize the standards, see Mintz, "International
Banking: United States-United Kingdom Capital Adequacy Agreement",
28 Harv. Int'l L.J. 499 (1987). On March 4, 1987, the two central
banks announced a proposal for co-ordinating the method of
integrating international banks' swaps business into the joint
capital adequacy scheme. This latter proposal, entitled "Agreed
Proposal; Credit Equivalent Amounts for Interest Rate and Foreign
Exchange Rate Related Instruments" was published by the Federal
Reserve at 52 Fed. Reg. 9310 (1987) and the Federal Reserve's
proposed changes in its capital adequacy Guidelines to accomodate
this secondary Agreed Proposal appear at 52 Fed. Reg. 9304 et seq.
(1987). See Kerr, "U.K./U.S. proposal on swap capital require-
ments", Int'l Financial L.R. May 1987 at 19 for sophisticated
discussion.
